Israel will find itself diplomatically sidelined and militarily muzzled as the United States pursues a nuclear deal with Iran next year, according to a closed-door wargame at Israel's top strategic think tank.
Not even a warning shot by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu - the simulation featured an undeclared Israeli commando raid on Iran's Arak heavy water plant - would shake U.S. President Barack Obamas's insistence on dialogue.
Israel's arch-foe, meanwhile, will likely keep enriching uranium, perhaps even winning the grudging assent of the West.
"The Iranians came out feeling better than the Americans, as they were simply more determined to stick to their objectives," said Giora Eiland, a former Israeli national security adviser who played Netanyahu in the Nov. 1 wargame at Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
Reflecting Israel's relative isolation, Eiland and his team spent much of the simulation sequestered from the multilateral talks in the snug, three-storey INSS building.
"Netanyahu" did have hallway encounters with President Barack Obama -- played by Zvi Rafiah, an Israeli ex-diplomat with extensive U.S. ties. But their chats were hasty and hazy.
"Our leverage over the Americans, when we could prise them away from the Iranians and Europeans and others, was limited," Eiland told Reuters. "Pretty much the only card we had to play was the military action card. And that's a faded card."
Assumed to have the region's sole atomic arsenal, Israel has hinted at preemptive air strikes as a last resort for denying Iran the means to make a bomb. But many experts believe Israel would be tactically stymied and loath to cross Washington, which is wary of unleashing a fresh Middle East conflict.
"I care about Israel. I must defend Israel. But Israel cannot act unilaterally," said Rafiah, channelling Obama.
We now have Mahmoud Abbas's answer regarding short-term Palestinian Authority strategy. He says that if Israel stops all construction now - in east Jerusalem and the 3,000 apartments being completed - and accepts in advance the 1967 borders, there will be peace within six months. This is the basic story we've been hearing since around 1988: One or more Israeli concessions and everyone will live happily ever after.
This is clearly bait being dangled for President Barack Obama, offering him an "easy" way out of his dilemma of not having any peace talks after almost a year in office: Pressure Israel to give up more and you will look good, with plenty of photo opportunities of you presiding over Israel-PA talks.
Of course, what Abbas wants to do is remove one of the main points of Israeli leverage, the borders to be agreed upon and the status of east Jerusalem. Moreover, he is leaving out both the additional demands he will be making (all Palestinians who want to can go live in Israel) and all the Israeli demands he will be ignoring (recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, the end of the conflict and dropping all Palestinian claims, security guarantees, an unmilitarized Palestinian state, settling all refugees in Palestine).
In addition, of course, he can't speak for about half the people and territory he claims to represent; that is, the Gaza Strip. And by not holding elections and unilaterally extending his term, Abbas leaves the door open for some future Palestinian leadership saying he had no legitimate mandate to negotiate and therefore any agreement he made isn't binding.
Finally, he made one very big misstatement, hoping - as usual - that the West pays no attention to what's said in Arabic. He claimed that the PA stopped incitement against Israel, in terms of urging violence and rejecting Israel's existence. While the PA is, of course, far better than Hamas on such matters, a very large dossier can be compiled on how that is a lie.
THE QUESTION is what will the Obama administration do? Is it going to press Israel for further unilateral concessions so that the PA will agree to talks and Obama can call it a success? Will it try to get the PA to do something in terms of confidence-building measures or to talk without preconditions? Israel is certainly not going to accept the 1967 borders with absolutely no change before even talking with the PA (and probably not even as part of a peace agreement).
Indeed, it is now Obama administration policy that there need to be minor border modifications to accommodate the post-1967 changes on the ground. Moreover, Israel can say that if it stops all construction immediately, including in east Jerusalem, the PA still won't talk, so what's the point?
Incidentally, Abbas admitted that he never asked for an Israeli construction freeze before but is only doing so in the context of the road map. However, even after the road map, Abbas never made this a big issue until after Obama demanded a construction freeze. In objective terms, the president has no one to blame but himself for this mess, but of course he won't do that. He has to blame either Israel or the PA. Which will it be?
At the same time, there's a new trend worth noting in the West Bank and the PA: a sense of satisfaction. While the Western media generally reflect the rather false-front public relations' campaign waged by the PA - bitter, frustrated, victimized and eager for peace - that's not what's really going on right now.
Abbas's government has to weather some difficult politicking along the following lines:
• He has extended his own term in office indefinitely and cancelled January 2010 elections without receiving much criticism from within the PA. After all, Hamas won't let any balloting happen in the Gaza Strip and who knows which side might win a fair vote?
• The PA has been rounding up Hamas activists and maintaining security on the West Bank while - with a lot of help and some pressure from Israel - preventing cross-border attacks.
• The economy is doing well with relative prosperity in the West Bank, though this could collapse in hours if the PA lets violence reappear.
• Abbas has contained intensive criticism from his colleagues about his being too "soft" in his dealings with Obama.
• He has worked out a way to refuse negotiations while blaming it on Israel.
• No matter what the PA does, international media coverage, support from Europe and a lack of criticism from the US government seem assured.
THERE ARE plenty of things to be pleased about even though the peace process is dead, there's no realistic prospect of a state and Hamas looks set to govern the Gaza Strip forever.
What's really true - though often misunderstood in the West - is that a no war, no peace option suits the PA just fine right now. There is a question of whether hotheads among Abbas's colleagues, a Hamas sabotage or some accidental event will set off a new confrontation. Yet that doesn't seem too likely in the short- to medium-run.
Finally, while Fatah and the PA can't wean themselves - indeed, they aren't even trying - off a basic strategy whose main goal is destroying Israel some day, that doesn't mean they can't get along with Israel on a current basis. Behind the scenes, things aren't so bad.
Indeed, when Abbas speaks privately, he is likely to spend much of his time attacking Hamas and urging tougher sanctions on Iran. He knows who his real enemies are, even if most Western observers take him at his (public) word.
The Likud’s efforts to divide the party that caused the Likud’s own division four years ago appear to be successful.
Though most of the main players in the anticipated political shake-up are publicly denying it, it appears that seven Kadima MKs – the minimum necessary for an official breakaway from the party – are strongly considering splitting off, forming their own faction, and then joining the Likud in one way or another.
Party leader Tzipi Livni, who is also leads the Opposition in the Knesset, has met with some of the MKs who are said to be interested in leaving. It is not known how her efforts to convince them to remain in the party were received.
Livni Jabs at Netanyahu
Livni’s public response was this: “While the public believes that Netanyahu is busy every minute with the Shalit affair and his difficult deliberations, it turns out the he feels that there are things that are even more important to him. The Opposition has acted with its eye on the common good, while Netanyahu is the first prime minister to deal obsessively with the Opposition instead of affairs of state.”
The Livni-led Opposition in fact withdrew a proposed no-confidence motion in the government this week, because of the tense and ongoing negotiations for the exchange of hundreds of terrorists for abducted soldier Gilad Shalit.
Among the Kadima MKs mentioned as possible Kadima breakaways are Otniel Schneller, Ruhama Avraham-Belila, Yaakov Edri, Zev Boim, Eli Aflalo, Marina Solodkin. MK Schneller has said recently, “The issue of joining the Likud is complex and not simple.”
Others, such as former Likudniks Belila-Avraham and Edri, have denied the story more strenuously. The former said that Netanyahu would have an easier time getting all of Kadima to join the government than just parts thereof.
A Matter of Time
Despite this, many in the political establishment say that the deal has basically been concluded and that it is just a matter of time before it happens. Netanyahu has apparently offered ministerial portfolios to three of the seven, deputy minister-ships to another three, and the head of a Knesset committee to the last one.
In addition, Netanyahu is promising that he will ensure their political future within the Likud – though it is obvious that the results of Central Committee votes for positions on future lists of Likud Knesset candidates cannot be guaranteed.
How Many are Needed?
In order to form an official breakaway faction, at least a third of the party’s MKs. but not more than seven, are required to split off from Kadima, which currently has 28 MKs, one more than the Likud. In the case of Labor, where talk of a split has also been rampant, only five of its 13 MKs - more than one third - are necessary for a breakway, two less than needed in Kadima.
'Likud's Revenge'
Kadima was formed in late 2005 by then-Likud leader Ariel Sharon after he faced strong internal party opposition over his Disengagement/expulsion from Gush Katif and northern Samaria. Most of Kadima's legislators were Likud party MKs, and their departure led the Likud to drop from 29 Knesset seats to 12 in the 2006 election.
It is therefore clear that the Likud would find sweet political revenge if it succeeds in splitting Kadima.