
As Government Tags Passports, Licenses, Critics Fear Privacy Is 'chipped' Away
Climbing into his Volvo, outfitted with a Matrics antenna and a Motorola reader  he'd bought on eBay for $190, Chris Paget cruised the streets of San Francisco  with this objective: To read the identity cards of strangers, wirelessly,  without ever leaving his car.
It took him 20 minutes to strike hacker's  gold.
Zipping past Fisherman's Wharf, his scanner detected, then  downloaded to his laptop, the unique serial numbers of two pedestrians'  electronic U.S. passport cards embedded with radio frequency identification, or  RFID, tags. Within an hour, he'd "skimmed" the identifiers of four more of the  new, microchipped PASS cards from a distance of 20 feet.
Embedding  identity documents _ passports, drivers licenses, and the like _ with RFID chips  is a no-brainer to government officials. Increasingly, they are promoting it as  a 21st century application of technology that will help speed border crossings,  safeguard credentials against counterfeiters, and keep terrorists from sneaking  into the country.
But Paget's February experiment demonstrated something  privacy advocates had feared for years: That RFID, coupled with other  technologies, could make people trackable without their knowledge or consent.
He filmed his drive-by heist, and soon his video went viral on the Web,  intensifying a debate over a push by government, federal and state, to put  tracking technologies in identity documents and over their potential to erode  privacy.
Putting a traceable RFID in every pocket has the potential to  make everybody a blip on someone's radar screen, critics say, and to redefine  Orwellian government snooping for the digital age.
"Little Brother," some  are already calling it _ even though elements of the global surveillance web  they warn against exist only on drawing boards, neither available nor approved  for use.
But with advances in tracking technologies coming at an  ever-faster rate, critics say, it won't be long before governments could be able  to identify and track anyone in real time, 24-7, from a cafe in Paris to the  shores of California.
The key to getting such a system to work, these  opponents say, is making sure everyone carries an RFID tag linked to a biometric  data file.
On June 1, it became mandatory for Americans entering the  United States by land or sea from Canada, Mexico, Bermuda and the Caribbean to  present identity documents embedded with RFID tags, though conventional  passports remain valid until they expire.
Among new options are the  chipped "e-passport," and the new, electronic PASS card _ credit-card sized,  with the bearer's digital photograph and a chip that can be scanned through a  pocket, backpack or purse from 30 feet.
Alternatively, travelers can use  "enhanced" driver's licenses embedded with RFID tags now being issued in some  border states: Washington, Vermont, Michigan and New York. Texas and Arizona  have entered into agreements with the federal government to offer chipped  licenses, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has recommended expansion  to non-border states. Kansas and Florida officials have received DHS briefings  on the licenses, agency records show.
The purpose of using RFID is not to  identify people, says Mary Ellen Callahan, the chief privacy officer at Homeland  Security, but rather "to verify that the identification document holds valid  information about you."
Likewise, U.S. border agents are "pinging"  databases only to confirm that licenses aren't counterfeited. "They're not  pulling up your speeding tickets," she says, or looking at personal information  beyond what is on a passport.
The change is largely about speed and  convenience, she says. An RFID document that doubles as a U.S. travel credential  "only makes it easier to pull the right record fast enough, to make sure that  the border flows, and is operational" _ even though a 2005 Government  Accountability Office report found that governmentRFID readers often failed to  detect travelers' tags.
Such assurances don't persuade those who liken  RFID-embedded documents to barcodes with antennas and contend they create risks  to privacy that far outweigh the technology's heralded benefits. They warn it  will actually enable identity thieves, stalkers and other criminals to commit  "contactless" crimes against victims who won't immediately know they've been  violated.
Neville Pattinson, vice president for government affairs at  Gemalto, Inc., a major supplier of microchipped cards, is no RFID basher. He's a  board member of the Smart Card Alliance, an RFID industry group, and is serving  on the Department of Homeland Security's Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory  Committee.
Still, Pattinson has sharply criticized the RFIDs in U.S.  driver's licenses and passport cards. In a 2007 article for the Privacy Advisor,  a newsletter for privacy professionals, he called them vulnerable "to attacks  from hackers, identity thieves and possibly even terrorists."
RFID, he  wrote, has a fundamental flaw: Each chip is built to faithfully transmit its  unique identifier "in the clear, exposing the tag number to interception during  the wireless communication."
Once a tag number is intercepted, "it is  relatively easy to directly associate it with an individual," he says. "If this  is done, then it is possible to make an entire set of movements posing as  somebody else without that person's knowledge."