
What happened at the Fatah congress? It was largely successful at maintaining  the status quo, but the outcome is unlikely to be conducive to a comprehensive  peace. And there's one terribly dangerous issue - the next Fatah leader - which  could blow up everything. 
Once Mahmoud Abbas appoints four more  officials to form a Fatah central committee of 22 people, at least two-thirds  will be old-style Fatah bureaucrats, with almost all the rest members of the  younger guard. Of the 18 elected, at least five are hard-liners who don't even  accept the peace process and the Oslo Accords and the rest are Abbas's allies or  lieutenants. The latter are not extremists by Palestinian standards; they are  happy to negotiate with Israel and don't want to go to war, for now at least.  But they will insist on having all Palestinian refugees who wish to do live in  Israel, adherence to the 1967 borders, no recognition of Israel as a Jewish  state, and perhaps they won't support a formal ending of the conflict and will  give very little, if anything, on security arrangements. 
Only two men  can be called moderates: Muhammad Shtayyeh, a private sector reformist type who  was last to get into the committee, making it by a single vote, and Nabil  Sha'ath, a Fatah loyalist. 
And only one of the 18 men elected has been  an important critic of the establishment: Marwan Barghouti, who is currently  serving time in an Israeli prison. Call him a practically-minded radical who  believes Israel must be driven out of the West Bank by force. 
There is  no question that the meeting was a success for the Fatah establishment and for  the PLO, and PA leader Mahmoud Abbas in particular. But like many such  successes, it will be paid for by an inability to move toward peace as well as  Palestinian suffering. As Fatah continues the conflict and blocks a resolution  for years, they face lower living standards and destructive violence. If Fatah  becomes more radical, as indicated by Abbas's choice for successor, the  Palestinian people will suffer even more. 
Yet despite the fact that  rejecting peace will hurt their people more than those of Israel, on every issue  where it had to choose between peace-oriented flexibility and intransigence, the  Fatah leadership chose the latter. For example, Fatah has now officially adopted  the al-Aqsa Brigades as its armed wing. The next time that group commits a  terror attack, Fatah is going to have to take responsibility for it. That  decision will make peace less possible and Israel-Palestinian clashes more  likely. 
And what about the implications of the now-official conspiracy  theory that Israel killed Yasser Arafat, when actually it was his own lifestyle  and inadequate medical care that did so? 
I want to stress that Fatah in  its current form is not an extremist entity eager to tear up previous agreements  and go to war (though that could happen), it is a group with which Israel must  try to work to stabilize the situation, minimize violence and keep Hamas from  seizing control of the West Bank. 
More importantly for Western  governments, this isn't a leadership which will strive for a comprehensive peace  agreement. Since achieving that often seems the number-one goal of US and  European governments, it is of broad significance. 
But there's one more  thing that should be the main headline. 
Fatah has apparently chosen as  its next leader a man who rejects the 1993 Israel-PLO (Oslo) agreement and the  ensuing peace process. Muhammad Ghaneim was so passionately opposed even to  negotiating with Israel that he refused to go to the Gaza Strip and West Bank  with Arafat in 1994. 
He also refused to participate in the PA as long as  it was involved in the peace process. 
So can Ghaneim participate now  because he has changed his mind, or rather - as seems more likely - that Fatah  no longer takes the peace process seriously? This situation is equivalent to  Russia picking a hard-line Stalinist as its next leader. 
Why did  two-thirds of the delegates vote for him? Ghaneim got 33 percent more votes than  Barghouti, who not only has a personal base of support but the chic of being a  prisoner. 
Ghaneim is not that personally popular. I speculate that he's  the chosen candidate of hard-line Fatah chief Farouk Kaddoumi, a man close to  Syria's radical dictatorship, who is popular but too old to run  himself. 
The key reason is that Abbas and his colleagues told delegates  to vote for Ghaneim. Why? Part of the answer might be that he has a good  personal relationship with Ghaneim. In addition, Ghaneim seems able to bridge  the two groups which make up the Fatah leadership: radicals who thought Arafat  too moderate, and hardliners who supported Arafat and now back  Abbas. 
Finally, the West Bank warlords and political barons find it  hard, as so often happens in politics, to give up their own ambitions and accept  one of their rivals as chief. It's easier to accept an outsider who hasn't been  in the West Bank at all and with whom one hasn't personally quarreled or  competed. Abbas may well retire in the next year, and Ghaneim would then become  leader of the PA, PLO and Fatah, too. This is incredibly important, far more so  than the minor changes which are monopolizing debate over the  meeting. 
I'm reminded here of the last Palestinian elections, when I  correctly predicted a Hamas victory. How? Simply by analyzing the previous local  elections and looking at the candidate lists. 
The State Department  depended, however, on opinion polls taken by a Fatah activist, a decent and  moderate guy but nevertheless a partisan. Hamas won and later seized the Gaza  Strip. This was a disaster for US policy (and also the Palestinians, the Arab  regimes, Israel and the region in general). 
Should I mention the idea  held by many in the West that it didn't matter when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini  emerged in 1978 as the Iranian revolution's leader? This kind of mistake is not  equivalent to predicting a complex, relatively unexpected event (say, the  reformist turn and political collapse of the USSR) because here we have all the  information we need to see the direction of events. 
If Ghaneim takes  over, you can not only forget about peace - which doesn't look too promising  anyway - but the status quo could also be jeopardized. The re-radicalization of  Fatah might lead to a very big, even violent, sustained crisis. Attention must  be paid to this development. 
When propagandists distort the facts, they  fool only others. When Western policy-makers distort the facts, they fool  themselves with ultimately devastating results.