
Makers  of surveillance systems are offering governments across the world the  ability to track the movements of almost anybody who carries a  cellphone, whether they are blocks away or on another continent.
 
 The technology works by exploiting an essential fact of all  cellular networks: They must keep detailed, up-to-the-minute records on  the locations of their customers to deliver calls and other services to  them. Surveillance systems are secretly collecting these records to map  people’s travels over days, weeks or longer, according to company  marketing documents and experts in surveillance technology.
 
 The world’s most powerful intelligence services, such as the  National Security Agency and Britain’s GCHQ, long have used cellphone  data to track targets around the globe. But experts say these new  systems allow less technically advanced governments to track people in  any nation — including the United States — with relative ease and  precision.
 
 Users of such technology type a phone number into a computer  portal, which then collects information from the location databases  maintained by cellular carriers, company documents show. In this way,  the surveillance system learns which cell tower a target is currently  using, revealing his or her location to within a few blocks in an urban  area or a few miles in a rural one.
 
 It is unclear which governments have acquired these tracking  systems, but one industry official, speaking on the condition of  anonymity to share sensitive trade information, said that dozens of  countries have bought or leased such technology in recent years. This  rapid spread underscores how the burgeoning, multibillion-dollar  surveillance industry makes advanced spying technology available  worldwide.
 
 “Any tin-pot dictator with enough money to buy the system could  spy on people anywhere in the world,” said Eric King, deputy director of  Privacy International, a London-based activist group that warns about  the abuse of surveillance technology. “This is a huge problem.”
 
 Security experts say hackers, sophisticated criminal gangs and  nations under sanctions also could use this tracking technology, which  operates in a legal gray area. It is illegal in many countries to track  people without their consent or a court order, but there is no clear  international legal standard for secretly tracking people in other  countries, nor is there a global entity with the authority to police  potential abuses.
 
 In response to questions from The Washington Post this month, the  Federal Communications Commission said it would investigate possible  misuse of tracking technology that collects location data from carrier  databases. The United States restricts the export of some surveillance  technology, but with multiple suppliers based overseas, there are few  practical limits on the sale or use of these systems internationally.
 
 “If this is technically possible, why couldn’t anybody do this  anywhere?” said Jon Peha, a former White House scientific adviser and  chief technologist for the FCC who is now an engineering professor at  Carnegie Mellon University. He was one of several telecommunications  experts who reviewed the marketing documents at The Post’s request.
 
 “I’m worried about foreign governments, and I’m even more worried  about non-governments,” Peha said. “Which is not to say I’d be happy  about the NSA using this method to collect location data. But better  them than the Iranians.”
 
 ‘Locate. Track. Manipulate.’
 
 Location tracking is an increasingly common part of modern life.  Apps that help you navigate through a city or find the nearest coffee  shop need to know your location. Many people keep tabs on their teenage  children — or their spouses — through tracking apps on smartphones. But  these forms of tracking require consent; mobile devices typically allow  these location features to be blocked if users desire.
 
 Tracking systems built for intelligence services or police,  however, are inherently stealthy and difficult — if not impossible — to  block. Private surveillance vendors offer government agencies several  such technologies, including systems that collect cellular signals from  nearby phones and others that use malicious software to trick phones  into revealing their locations.
 
 Governments also have long had the ability to compel carriers to  provide tracking data on their customers, especially within their own  countries. The National Security Agency, meanwhile, taps into  telecommunication-system cables to collect cellphone location data on a  mass, global scale.
 
 But tracking systems that access carrier location databases are  unusual in their ability to allow virtually any government to track  people across borders, with any type of cellular phone, across a wide  range of carriers — without the carriers even knowing. These systems  also can be used in tandem with other technologies that, when the  general location of a person is already known, can intercept calls and  Internet traffic, activate microphones, and access contact lists, photos  and other documents.
 
 Companies that make and sell surveillance technology seek to limit  public information about their systems’ capabilities and client lists,  typically marketing their technology directly to law enforcement and  intelligence services through international conferences that are closed  to journalists and other members of the public.
 
 Yet marketing documents obtained by The Washington Post show that  companies are offering powerful systems that are designed to evade  detection while plotting movements of surveillance targets on  computerized maps. The documents claim system success rates of more than  70 percent.
 
 A 24-page marketing brochure for SkyLock, a cellular tracking  system sold by Verint, a maker of analytics systems based in Melville,  N.Y., carries the subtitle “Locate. Track. Manipulate.” The document,  dated January 2013 and labeled “Commercially Confidential,” says the  system offers government agencies “a cost-effective, new approach to  obtaining global location information concerning known targets.”
 
 The brochure includes screen shots of maps depicting location  tracking in what appears to be Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil,  Congo, the United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe and several other countries.  Verint says on its Web site that it is “a global leader in Actionable  Intelligence solutions for customer engagement optimization, security  intelligence, and fraud, risk and compliance,” with clients in “more  than 10,000 organizations in over 180 countries.”
 
 (Privacy International has collected several marketing brochures  on cellular surveillance systems, including one that refers briefly to  SkyLock, and posted them on its Web site. The 24-page SkyLock brochure  and other material was independently provided to The Post by people  concerned that such systems are being abused.)
 
 Verint, which also has substantial operations in Israel, declined  to comment for this story. It says in the marketing brochure that it  does not use SkyLock against U.S. or Israeli phones, which could violate  national laws. But several similar systems, marketed in recent years by  companies based in Switzerland, Ukraine and elsewhere, likely are free  of such limitations.
 
 At The Post’s request, telecommunications security researcher  Tobias Engel used the techniques described by the marketing documents to  determine the location of a Post employee who used an AT&T phone  and consented to the tracking. Based only on her phone number, Engel  found the Post employee’s location, in downtown Washington, to within a  city block — a typical level of precision when such systems are used in  urban areas.
 
 “You’re obviously trackable from all over the planet if you have a  cellphone with you, as long as it’s turned on,” said Engel, who is  based in Berlin. “It’s possible for almost anyone to track you as long  as they are willing to spend some money on it.”
 
 AT&T declined to comment for this story.
 
 Exploiting the SS7 network
 
 The tracking technology takes advantage of the lax security of  SS7, a global network that cellular carriers use to communicate with one  another when directing calls, texts and Internet data.
 
 The system was built decades ago, when only a few large carriers  controlled the bulk of global phone traffic. Now thousands of companies  use SS7 to provide services to billions of phones and other mobile  devices, security experts say. All of these companies have access to the  network and can send queries to other companies on the SS7 system,  making the entire network more vulnerable to exploitation. Any one of  these companies could share its access with others, including makers of  surveillance systems.
 
 The tracking systems use queries sent over the SS7 network to ask  carriers what cell tower a customer has used most recently. Carriers  configure their systems to transmit such information only to trusted  companies that need it to direct calls or other telecommunications  services to customers. But the protections against unintended access are  weak and easily defeated, said Engel and other researchers.
 
 By repeatedly collecting this location data, the tracking systems  can show whether a person is walking down a city street or driving down a  highway, or whether the person has recently taken a flight to a new  city or country.
 
 “We don’t have a monopoly on the use of this and probably can be  sure that other governments are doing this to us in reverse,” said  lawyer Albert Gidari Jr., a partner at Perkins Coie who specializes in  privacy and technology.
 
 Carriers can attempt to block these SS7 queries but rarely do so  successfully, experts say, amid the massive data exchanges coursing  through global telecommunications networks. P1 Security, a research firm  in Paris, has been testing one query commonly used for surveillance,  called an “Any Time Interrogation” query, that prompts a carrier to  report the location of an individual customer. Of the carriers tested so  far, 75 percent responded to “Any Time Interrogation” queries by  providing location data on their customers. (Testing on U.S. carriers  has not been completed.)
 
 “People don’t understand how easy it is to spy on them,” said Philippe Langlois, chief executive of P1 Security.
 
 The GSMA, a London-based trade group that represents carriers and  equipment manufacturers, said it was not aware of the existence of  tracking systems that use SS7 queries, but it acknowledged serious  security issues with the network, which is slated to be gradually  replaced over the next decade because of a growing list of security and  technical shortcomings.
 
 “SS7 is inherently insecure, and it was never designed to be  secure,” said James Moran, security director for the GSMA. “It is  possible, with access to SS7, to trigger a request for a record from a  network.”
 
 The documents for Verint and several other companies say that the  surveillance services are intended for governments and that customers  must abide by laws regarding their use. Yet privacy advocates and other  critics say the surveillance industry is inherently secretive, poorly  regulated and indiscriminate in selecting its customers, sometimes  putting profoundly intrusive tools into the hands of governments with  little respect for human rights or tolerance of political dissent.
 
 Refining the techniques
 
 Engel, the German telecommunications security researcher, was the  first to publicly disclose the ability to use carrier networks to  surreptitiously gather user location information, at a 2008 conference  sponsored by the Chaos Computer Club, a hacker activist group based in  Germany. The techniques Engel used that day were far cruder than the  ones used by today’s cellular tracking systems but still caused a stir  in the security community.
 
 From the lectern, he asked for help from a volunteer from the  audience. A man in an untucked plaid shirt ambled up with his cellphone  in one hand and a beer in the other. Engel typed the number into his  computer, and even though it was for a British phone, a screen at the  front of the room soon displayed the current location — in Berlin.
 
 Two years later, a pair of American telecommunications researchers  expanded on Engel’s discovery with a program they called “The Carmen  Sandiego Project,” named after a popular educational video game and  television series that taught geography by having users answer  questions.
 
 Researchers Don Bailey and Nick DePetrillo found that the rough  locations provided by Engel’s technique could be mixed with other  publicly available data to better map the locations of users. They even  accessed the video feeds of highway cameras along Interstate 70 in  Denver to gain a clearer picture of targeted cellphone users.
 
 “We could tell that they were going a certain speed on I-70,”  Bailey recalled. “Not only could you track a person, you could remotely  identify a car and who was driving.”
 
 An official for AT&T, Patrick McCanna, was in the audience  when DePetrillo and Bailey presented their findings at a conference in  2010. McCanna praised the researchers for their work, they later said,  and recruited their help to make it harder to gather location data.
 
 Many of the world’s largest cellular networks made similar efforts, though significant loopholes remained.
 
 As some carriers tightened their defenses, surveillance industry  researchers developed even more effective ways to collect data from SS7  networks. The advanced systems now being marketed offer more-precise  location information on targets and are harder for carriers to detect or  defeat.
 
 Telecommunications experts say networks have become so complex  that implementing new security measures to defend against these  surveillance systems could cost billions of dollars and hurt the  functioning of basic services, such as routing calls, texts and Internet  to customers.
 
 “These systems are massive. And they’re running close to capacity  all the time, and to make changes to how they interact with hundreds or  thousands of phones is really risky,” said Bart Stidham, a longtime  telecommunications system architect based in Virginia. “You don’t know  what happens.”
 
 Paired up with ‘catchers’
 
 Companies that market SS7 tracking systems recommend using them in  tandem with “IMSI catchers,” increasingly common surveillance devices  that use cellular signals collected directly from the air to intercept  calls and Internet traffic, send fake texts, install spyware on a phone,  and determine precise locations.
 
 IMSI catchers — also known by one popular trade name, StingRay —  can home in on somebody a mile or two away but are useless if a target’s  general location is not known. SS7 tracking systems solve that problem  by locating the general area of a target so that IMSI catchers can be  deployed effectively. (The term “IMSI” refers to a unique identifying  code on a cellular phone.)
 
 The FCC recently created an internal task force to study misuse of  IMSI catchers by criminal gangs and foreign intelligence agencies,  which reportedly have used the systems to spy on American citizens,  businesses and diplomats. It is legal for law enforcement agencies in  the United States to use IMSI catchers for authorized purposes.
 
 When asked by The Post about systems that use SS7 tracking, FCC  spokeswoman Kim Hart said, “This type of system could fall into the  category of technologies that we expect the FCC’s internal task force to  examine.”
 
 The marketing brochure for Verint’s SkyLock system suggests using  it in conjunction with Verint’s IMSI catcher, called the Engage GI2.  Together, they allow government agencies “to accurately pinpoint their  suspect for apprehension, making it virtually impossible for targets to  escape, no matter where they reside in the world.”
 
 Verint can install SkyLock on the networks of cellular carriers if  they are cooperative — something that telecommunications experts say is  common in countries where carriers have close relationships with their  national governments. Verint also has its own “worldwide SS7 hubs” that  “are spread in various locations around the world,” says the brochure.  It does not list prices for the services, though it says that Verint  charges more for the ability to track targets in many far-flung  countries, as opposed to only a few nearby ones.
 
 Among the most appealing features of the system, the brochure  says, is its ability to sidestep the cellular operators that sometimes  protect their users’ personal information by refusing government  requests or insisting on formal court orders before releasing  information.
 
 “In most cases mobile operators are not willing to cooperate with  operational agencies in order to provide them the ability to gain  control and manipulate the network services given to its subscribers,”  the brochure says. “Verint’s SkyLock is a global geo-location solution  which was designed and developed to address the limitations mentioned  above, and meet operational agency requirements.”
 
 Another company, Defentek, markets a similar system called  Infiltrator Global Real-Time Tracking System on its Web site, claiming  to “locate and track any phone number in the world.”
 
 The site adds: “It is a strategic solution that infiltrates and is  undetected and unknown by the network, carrier, or the target.”
 
 The company, which according to the Web site is registered in Panama City, declined to comment for this story.